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Abstract: Focusing on individual labor market positions, this article proposes a new 
approach to elicit and measure constraints faced by rural households. Under market 
imperfections, individuals fail to equalize their hourly income to their shadow wage and 
become over- or underemployed. We estimate and explain this gap in a stochastic frontier 
framework for rural Vietnam. Both employees and farmers are found to fail in equalizing 
their hourly income to their shadow wage. Constraints faced by farmers are found to be 
stronger than that of employees: farmers’ marginal revenue of labor is 3 times higher than 
their shadow wage while market wages earned by employees are 1.5 times higher than 
their shadow wages. Price risk is found to be the most important constraint faced by 
Vietnamese rural farmers while employees would benefit from the development of the road 
network.  
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Introduction 
Even in the most advanced economies, people face market imperfections that constraint 
their behavior and reduce economic efficiency. In developing economies, where these failures are 
the most important, they can even prevent people from escaping out of poverty by limiting the range 
of opportunities they can grab. From an economic policy point of view, De Janvry, Fafchamps and 
Sadoulet (1991) showed that market imperfections can make peasants irresponsive to price 
incentives, limiting the impact of standard development tools. Hence, a central question for 
economic development is to elicit the market failures that households face and to solve them. 
Empirical literature has extensively shown that rural households are very likely to be constrained and 
theoretical literature provides many possible sources for market imperfections, but which are the 
most relevant remains unanswered. The objective of this article is to find which are the most 
important in order to propose an agenda for economic policy based on microeconomic empirical 
evidence of the constraints faced by rural households in Vietnam.  
As noted by Barrett, Sherlund and Adesina (2008) “the principal asset of the poor is their 
labor”. And it is also a very flexible input for agricultural production. So, the main hypothesis in this 
article is that if a household is constrained by some market failure, this latter can be recovered when 
studying household members’ labor market position. This idea was initiated by Skoufias (1994) who 
argued that differences between market wage and marginal revenue of labor indicate a labor market 
constraint. Recently, Barrett, Sherlund and Adesina (2008) mitigated this result1 by demonstrating 
that price uncertainty can also explain the gap between market wage and marginal revenue of labor, 
so that the same stylized fact (the inequality between market wage and marginal revenue of labor) 
can be explained by two phenomenons. The cause of this puzzling result lies in assumptions made for 
the identification of individual cost of time (also called opportunity cost of time, implicit wage or 
shadow wage): While Skoufias (1994) assumes that farmers can equalize their marginal revenue of 
labor to their shadow wage and that they are labor market constrained, Barrett, Sherlund and 
Adesina (2008) consider that output price uncertainty prevents farmers from adjusting their marginal 
revenue of labor to their shadow wage but put the labor market constraint aside, so that employees 
can equalize market wage and shadow wage. Both market failures highlighted by the authors surely 
exist and this article introduces an econometric method for retrieving shadow wages in a framework 
where both constraints bind.  
Assuming that other market failures could cause this gap, this article will test for many 
possible sources of inefficiency in a “horse race” approach. The argument is that interpretations of 
                                                           
1
 Their approach is based on Barrett (1996) so that the two articles will be cited indifferently 
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econometric results are often limited by mathematical formalization of the theoretical framework. In 
this case, the methodology should be reversed: econometric results should draw the way we are 
building theoretical models. A general econometric framework is proposed in which both farmers 
and employees can be constrained and in which we can test for possible sources of market failures 
including, among others, labor market constraint and price uncertainty.  
The approach consists in measuring individual shadow wages given that market 
imperfections prevent households from equalizing it to market wage and marginal revenue of labor. 
Basic microeconomic theory emphasizes that the shadow wage is the marginal rate of substitution 
from consumption to leisure valuated at the market price of consumption. So, the objective is to 
measure and explain the gap between this marginal rate of substitution and observed prices of labor 
(market wage or marginal revenue of labor) by some variables representing possible market failures 
proposed by the economic literature presented in the following section. The main difficulty is that 
the marginal rate of substitution is not observed. Section 3 will demonstrate that the problem can be 
handled by the estimation of a mixture of stochastic frontier models when we assume Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions. The method is very instructive as it allows us to determine whether people are 
constrained or not, who is constrained, why and how much, answering the four basic questions that 
must be asked when studying market imperfections.  
Econometric application to Vietnamese data for 2004, presented in section 4, shows that 
most of Vietnamese rural workers are under-employed (96% of the sample): their shadow wages are 
2.5 times lower than observed labor prices (market wage or marginal revenue of labor). Hence, 
reducing market imperfections could generate large efficiency gains and may be welfare improving. 
Econometric results demonstrate that the development of roads for employees and price 
stabilization policies toward peasants are very promising ways to increase economic efficiency in 
Vietnam. Finally, constraints faced by farmers are found to be stronger than that of employees, 
confirming the intuition developed by Barrett (1996).  
 
Literature Review 
The approach developed in this article is essentially based on two related literatures: the 
analysis of household’s constraints and the measurement of shadow wages. We present them in two 
distinct sub-sections despite the fact that some references belong to the two literatures in order to 
highlight the advances proposed in this paper. 
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 2.1 Household constraints 
 The problematic of the literature about households’ market imperfections has slightly changed 
in the recent years: While first approaches mainly questioned the presence of a constraint within the 
population, following articles clarified the problem, focusing on three main topics: Who is 
constrained? How much are they constrained? Why are they constrained?  
  2.1.1 First approaches: Is there a constraint? 
Many studies have analyzed the existence of market failures by testing the separation 
hypothesis: if a constraint binds, then consumption and production decisions are taken 
simultaneously (they are not separable) so that household characteristics (number of children, age of 
household head, educational level, etc.) affect production decisions such as market participation, 
input choices, level of production, etc.  Econometric tests have provided contrasting results: While 
Lopez (1984) and Grimard (2000) reject the separation hypothesis for Canada and Côte d’Ivoire, 
Benjamin (1992) cannot reject the hypothesis that household structure does not affect labor 
allocation decisions in rural Java. Bowlus and Sicular (2003) do not reject separability only for 
localities benefiting from sufficiently developed movements of resources, but separability is rejected 
overall in their sample, indicating that “factor markets remain underdeveloped” in China.  
  2.1.2 Who is constrained? 
As noted by Carter and Yao (2002), “Global tests for separability […] are theoretically 
inappropriate when the market failures […] differentially constrain some, but not all households”. 
Hence, the central question is not whether a constraint binds or not but whose constraint binds? 
Two main advances have been made in this sense by Lambert and Magnac (1998) and Vakis, 
Sadoulet, De Janvry and Cafiero (2004). Lambert and Magnac (1998) extend Skoufias (1994)’s 
method demonstrating theoretically that “a necessary and sufficient condition for recursivity to hold 
is that implicit prices […] are equal to market prices”. Computing standard errors for implicit prices, 
they can test individually the equality between shadow wage2 and market wage for each household 
and show that “non recursivity is a common case in their sample” of households in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Considering that this test is too sensitive to the specification and the estimation of a 
production function for agriculture, Vakis, Sadoulet, De Janvry and Cafiero (2004) propose another 
approach based on mixture models: Given that household characteristics affect production decisions 
only for constrained households, they prefer to measure the probability that a household is 
constrained (household characteristics affect production decisions) or not. Their study focuses on on-
                                                           
2
 Note that the shadow wage is supposed to equal the marginal revenue of labor as in Skoufias (1994) 
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farm labor supply and estimates the probability that a household is constrained (household 
characteristics affect on-farm labor supply). They find that, on average, a household has a probability 
of 0.51 of being constrained in rural Peru, confirming that market failures affect a large part of the 
population in rural areas.  
  2.1.3 Why are they constrained? 
Many possible constraints have been proposed in the literature (see for example: Sadoulet, 
De Janvry and Benjamin (1998) for price bands, Barrett (1996) for price uncertainty, Carter and Yao 
(2002) for land transfer rights, De Janvry, Sadoulet, Fafchamps and Raki (1992) for credit constraint). 
Most of the time, a theoretical model is introduced in order to focus on the constraint analyzed and 
interpretations of econometric results are driven by the hypothesis made when building the 
theoretical model. Because different models can explain the same phenomenon (see the 
introduction), policy implications can become confused: Why should we believe one interpretation 
more than others? Is the constraint under scrutiny the most important? Vakis, Sadoulet, De Janvry 
and Cafiero (2004) try to answer this question by putting some explanatory variables in the switcher 
equation of their mixture model so that they can test for some possible origins of non-separability 
and find that both demand (education, ethnicity, etc) and supply (availability of job opportunities) 
variables affect the probability of being constrained. This is a clear value added as compared to 
standard approach: while sources of non-separability are usually proposed by theory, Vakis, 
Sadoulet, De Janvry and Cafiero (2004) propose an econometric approach which could help 
identifying the most important failures faced by rural households and build more relevant theoretical 
models.  
2.1.4 How much are they constrained? 
Once one knows that households are constrained and why, a question remains: how much 
are they constrained? How much do they behave differently as compared to unconstrained ones? 
This is a central question because if constrained household do not really differ from unconstrained 
ones, then, there is no reason for a specific development policy toward them and standard policy 
tools should apply. This problem was questioned by De Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) who 
showed that market failures reduce the price elasticity of cash crop supply from 0.99 with no market 
failure to 0.18 when labor and food markets fail. It means that if a government wants to increase 
cash crop supply, it will have to increase the price of cash crops 5.5 times more if households are 
constrained than if they are not in order to obtain the same result. So the same economic policy 
would cost 5.5 more if households are constrained. This is a good argument for making government 
more sensitive to the problem of market failures. 
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Other studies focused on the output gap generated by market failures as a measure of the 
importance of inefficiencies: Estimating a “generalized indirect production function” in which a 
parametric function of other prices, cost and quasi-fixed inputs is substituted for shadow prices, 
Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar (1997) show that market imperfections induce an output loss of 
almost 12% for rice growers in West Bengal, India. Using an ex ante classification between credit 
constrained and unconstrained households, Boucher and Guirkinger (2008) estimate that 
“agricultural production could increase by 26% in Piura, Peru, if all credit constraints were 
eliminated”. 
The method proposed by Vakis, Sadoulet, De Janvry and Cafiero (2004) could easily be used 
to measure the “labor gap” generated by market imperfections. Hence, the method could answer the 
four basic question mentioned before (Is there a constraint? Who is constrained? Why? How much?) 
in a unified framework. However, in this framework, market failure variables influence the 
probability of being constrained but this gives no information about the inefficiency cost of each 
constraint. 
An alternative approach based on factor price equalization as in Skoufias (1994) or Lambert 
and Magnac (1998) is preferred here. However, while Lambert and Magnac (1998) argue that non 
rejection of factor price equalization on one market does not imply that recursivity holds because 
non-recursivity could arise because of another good, we argue that if a household is constrained, this 
constraint will always prevent him from reaching his optimal level of utility, so that the shadow price 
of labor will differ from observed labor prices whatever the source of inefficiency. 
The strategy relies on the idea that the gap between the shadow wage and observed labor 
prices (market wage or marginal revenue of labor) can be explained by market imperfections. A 
central issue is thus the measurement of individual shadow wage.  
2.2 How does the literature (mis)measure the opportunity cost of time? 
The opportunity cost of time is the price that one wants to be paid in order to work one more 
hour. As everybody has his own unobserved preferences over leisure and consumption, it is difficult 
to measure this opportunity cost directly. So, the economic literature uses to derive this shadow 
wage by assuming that it equals some other observed or easy-to-compute value. Here, I will 
distinguish between works devoted to the analysis of employed and self-employed people.  
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 2.2.1 Employees 
 As long as one considers that people do not face labor constraints, she can observe individual 
shadow wages simply by retrieving individual hourly wages of employees3. This assumption has been 
recently criticized by Feather and Shaw (1999) who consider that employees can be over-employed 
or under-employed because they are not free to choose their working time. In their framework, an 
individual is considered as under-employed (over-employed) if she would prefer to work more (less) 
for the same hourly wage. Using specific questions allowing them to distinguish ex-ante who is over 
or underemployed, they show that over-employed (under-employed) earn an hourly wage 
significantly lower (higher) than their shadow wage. So, observed market wages are not good 
measures of the shadow wage. The main drawback of this approach is that we need to know if 
people are over or under-employed ex-ante and this information is rarely available. The method 
needs to be extended to the case of unknown sample separation in order to be widely used. 
   2.2.2 Self-Employed 
 Market wages have been the only measure of the shadow wage for a long period of time 
during which self-employed people were considered as simple selection problem just like 
unemployed people. Thus, when Heckman (1974) developed his technique which allows recovering 
shadow wages for unemployed people, the method was also applied to self-employed. In 1993, 
Jacoby showed that we have much more information about self-employed than about unemployed: 
in his framework, the marginal revenue of labor equals the shadow wage. Thus, one can retrieve self-
employed shadow wages by simply estimating a production function. Skoufias (1994) used this result 
and tested the equality between market wage and marginal revenue of labor (considered as equating 
the shadow wage) and concluded that agricultural households are constrained on the labor market. 
Recently, Barrett, Sherlund and Adesina (2008) mitigated this result: They assumed no labor market 
imperfection but introduced allocative inefficiency due to uncertainty on output price for agricultural 
households and found the inequality between market wages and marginal revenue of labor. Hence, 
the same result (the inequality between market wage and marginal revenue of labor) can be 
explained by two possible imperfections: labor market imperfections and price uncertainty. Policy 
implications become confused. 
 As noted earlier, the source of the problem lies in the identification of the true shadow wage: 
if it differs from both market wage and marginal revenue of labor, how can we measure the 
opportunity cost of time? 
                                                           
3
 The problem of unemployed people is usually handled by Heckman’s selection technique. 
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What really is the “shadow wage”? Turning back to basic microeconomic theory 
 3.1 Standard neoclassical framework 
 Consider an individual with utility  = , ; 	 where “X” is the level of consumption, “l” the 
number of hours spent for leisure activities and “” some individual characteristics determining 
preferences over consumption and leisure. Each individual wants to maximize utility with respect to a 
budget constraint: 
 =  +  +  −  
Where “ = ℎ, 	” is the value of household production, “h” is on farm working time, 
“I” is a vector of inputs (with a price vector “") used in the production process, "y0" is non labor 
income, "" is off-farm working time and "" is hourly wage paid on the labor market. 
 If no other constraint binds, we obtain the standard result that the marginal rate of 
substitution from consumption to leisure equals the price ratios: 
 =
! =

"
"ℎ  
In this setting, the “shadow wage” is simply the marginal rate of substitution from 
consumption to leisure   ⁄ 	 valued at the market price of the consumption good 	 which 
equals the market wage and the marginal revenue of labor at equilibrium. 
∗ =   =  = 
"
"ℎ  
 Assuming that the shadow wage ∗ equals the market wage  or the marginal revenue of 
labor "/"ℎ simplifies the analysis because we don’t need to account for unobserved 
preferences. However, if some constraint binds (labor market constraint, price uncertainty, etc.) then 
the shadow wage doesn’t equal any observed value anymore and we have to focus on the problem 
of individual preferences over consumption and leisure. 
 3.2 Deviations from the neoclassical equilibrium 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function  = &', we know that 
∗ = ()
  
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Our problem is that we do not observe individual relative preference for leisure ( )	⁄  and 
we only know that  . "/"ℎ	 ≠ ∗ ≠  is likely to occur. However, this issue can be overcome by 
posing , .  . "/"ℎ	 = ∗ = ,-.  (where , > 0 and ,- > 0	 . To make things clearer, 
consider the case of employees. 
 3.2.1 The case of employed people 
Assume that ∗ = ,.   where , = 1 if our individual is not labor constrained. Following the 
terminology of Feather and Shaw (1999), if , ≥ 1 (0 <  , ≤ 1	, then our worker is overemployed 
(underemployed): he would prefer to work less (more) for the same hourly wage. 
Substituting ∗ by its expression, we obtain the following relation:  
 =
)
( , 
Our problem is to distinguish between preferences heterogeneity ) (⁄  and individual labor 
market constraint ,. Note that , bears two informations: it tells us whether people are constrained 
or not (if  , ≠ 1 or not) and how much they are constrained (how far is , from 1). It already answers 
two of the questions highlighted earlier: who is constrained and how much? 
The identification strategy relies upon Feather and Shaw (1999)’s classification which allows 
splitting employees into two groups: overemployed and underemployed. Considering 
underemployed workers, we know that , ≤ 1. Assume that the heterogeneity of preferences can be 
modeled as: ) (⁄ = 4	. 5  where 5 is unobserved heterogeneity. 
We obtain: 	 	⁄ = 4	. 5. , 
Taking logs, we obtain a stochastic “production” frontier model (see Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977)) so that 5 and , can be separated by 
maximum likelihood estimation: 
ln 7 8 = ln 4	 + 9 − : 
Where 9 = ln 5, is random and : = ln,	 ≥ 0.  
The same result applies to overemployed people with a small (but important) difference, so 
that we obtain a stochastic “cost” frontier model: 
ln 7 8 = ln 4	 + 9 + : 
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Our problem now reduces to the estimation of a mixture of two stochastic frontier models: 
one for underemployed people (the “production” model) and one for overemployed people (the 
“cost” model).  
  3.2.2 The case of self-employed 
 If one wants to adopt this approach for self-employed people, she needs to measure the 
marginal revenue of labor that should replace the market wage "" in our equation. The standard 
approach (Skoufias (1994), Lambert and Magnac (1998) or Barrett, Sherlund and Adesina (2008)) 
relies on the estimation of a production function that is often subject to critics (dealing with zeros in 
input quantities, missing variables, reduction of a long decision process to a simple equation, etc.). In 
order to avoid estimating such function, we follow Le (2009) and assume that   = ℎ, 	 =
;	. ℎ<, so that the marginal revenue of labor is => =  . ?.  ℎ	⁄ . 
We obtain:  
ln @
ℎ
A = ln 4	 + ln ? + 9 ± : 
where ? is labor elasticity of output. 
Hence, the final econometric specification is: 
ℎC = ( + DE + 9 − C: 
Where  
ℎC = ln	 − ln	 if our individual is an employee,  
ℎC = Fln	 − ln	G + Hlnℎ	 − lnIJK if our individual is self-employed, 
( = ln 4	 represents observed preferences heterogeneity, 
S=1 if the individual is a farmer and S=0 otherwise, 
E = ln ? is the production function parameter which helps identifying the marginal revenue of labor 
without estimating a production function, 
9 = ln 5 is random and represents unobserved preferences heterogeneity, 
: = ln,	 ≥ 0 is our “inefficiency parameter” and C = −1  if overemployed, and C = 1  if 
underemployed. 
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  3.2.3 Incorporating explanatory variables for inefficiency scores 
In Barrett (1996)’s framework, farmers’ labor position is determined by household net food 
buyer or net seller status which is related to land endowment: If the household owns a big cropping 
land, he is a net seller of the production good and labor is underemployed. However, if land is scarce 
for the household, he is a net buyer and labor is overemployed. It is thus necessary to include 
household land endowment as an explanatory variable of inefficiency scores of farmers in the model. 
Furthermore, the objective of this article is to provide a framework allowing us to design a policy 
agenda for rural households. Other explanatory variables that could influence ",", the inefficiency 
score will be introduced in order to perform a Horse Race for market imperfections. To do so, we 
adopt the stochastic frontier formulation proposed by Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli 
(1995) which assumes that : = ln,	 = LM +  where  ≥ −LM. 
The final specification is:  
ℎC = ( + DE + 9 − CFLM + G 
Where  ≥ −LM, C = −1  if overemployed, and C = 1  if underemployed. 
 
Method, data and estimation results 
 4.1 Estimation method 
 The identification strategy relies on the estimation of a mixture of two stochastic (truncated 
normal) frontier models (a “production” and a “cost” frontier) that share the same frontier. 
Following Huang and Liu (1994), we assume 9~O0; PQ	 and ~O0; PR	 truncated below at – LM. 
Battese and Coelli (1995) note that this specification is consistent with that of Kumbhakar, Ghosh and 
McGuckin (1991) which simply states that :~OTLM; PU	. The corresponding likelihood is: 
 = VWXX + 1 − X	UY 
U = 1PZ . [ 7
\ + LM
PZ 8 .Ф 7
LM
PZ] −
\]
PZ8 . ^Ф 7
LM
PU8_
`a
 
X = 1PZ . [ 7
\ − LM
PZ 8 .Ф 7
LM
PZ] +
\]
PZ8 . ^Ф 7
LM
PU8_
`a
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Where PZ = bPQc + PUc,   \ =  − ( − DE, ] = PU/PQ,  X is the share of the population 
overemployed and U (X) is the likelihood associated to under(over)employed workers. 
Estimation is performed via an Expectation – Maximization (E-M) algorithm (Dempster, Laird 
and Rubin (1977)) in order to deal with mixture. One of the main problems with this algorithm lies in 
the choice of initial values that must be good enough to catch the global maximum. Our strategy is to 
get a random value for X, then get initial values for the other parameters given this probability and 
switch to the EM algorithm and run 10 iterations4. Then, get another X and maximize again, and so 
on. The operation is repeated 30 times and we finally got the best parameters obtained (those that 
maximize the log-likelihood) and used it as initial values for a “long run” E-M algorithm5. This last run 
of the EM algorithm comprises a maximum 500 iterations6, followed by a final maximization of the 
incomplete log-likelihood. 
4.2 Estimation sample and Data 
 The method is tested on Vietnamese Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) data for the 
year 2004. Even if the approach should be applicable to an industrialized country (Feather and Shaw 
(1999) show that the employees in the United States suffer from over and underemployment), a 
developing country is supposed to be a best framework because constraints should be more likely to 
occur. Furthermore, as long as the objective of the article is to propose policy tools against poverty, a 
developing economy is more appropriated.  
  4.2.1 Individual data 
 VHLSS 2004 collects data from 46,000 households and include detailed questions about 
household members (age, sex, education, health, etc.), employment, agriculture, aquaculture, 
forestry, non-farm activities and household expenditures. In order to narrow the sample under 
scrutiny and to remain in the scope of the literature about market imperfections, we only keep 
employed workers and farmer in rural areas and drop information about urban areas, aquaculture, 
forestry and non-farm business. We only keep information about the main job (multiple job holding 
is widespread in Vietnam). The final sample contains 14 316 individuals. For each observation, 
information about age, sex, education and household size is collected and will be used as control 
variables for preferences heterogeneity. Mean expenditure in the household, leisure time, on-farm 
                                                           
4
 Each maximization step comprises a maximum of 20 iterations and likelihood tolerance is fixed at 0.01. 
5
 Likelihood tolerance for maximization steps of the long run algorithm is fixed at 0.001 and the maximum 
number of steps is 25.  
6 Convergence of the long run EM algorithm is declared if the improvement of the incomplete log-likelihood is 
less than 1.0E-06 
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working time, hourly wage if employed and agricultural production value were used when computing 
the left hand side variable. Finally, following Barrett (1996)’s argumentation, land per head 
endowment in the household is collected as a determinant of farmers inefficiency scores. 
4.2.2 Finding constraints in the data 
 The objective of the article is to elicit binding constraints of households in rural Vietnam. So we 
have to include variables representing possible constraints in the model. VHLSS data propose three 
sources for such variables: household questions about the constraints faced during production 
activities, community level questions about the most important constraints faced by farmers, and 
questions about “infrastructures” in the commune. 
  4.2.2.1 Household level questions 
 Household level questions should be preferred as they better capture individual situations. 
However, the questionnaire only proposes few possible constraints (access to capital, lack of 
knowledge about new technologies, disasters, prices variations or demand/supply balance) limiting 
the scope of the study (see table 1). Furthermore, only 42% of interviewed farmers declare 
themselves as constrained in their production activities and this tends to show that individuals are 
not aware of the constraints they face7.  
4.2.2.2 Community level questions  
 The commune questionnaire contains information about « the main difficulties faced by 
commune’s farmers in agricultural production ».  Constraints highlighted concern access to capital, 
lack of new varieties, lack of technical knowledge, prices or demand/supply impact, market access, 
irrigation network, disasters, pest disease, access to agricultural services and inappropriate 
agricultural policy. As in the case of household questionnaire, the main constraint cited by 
community leaders is access to capital (see table 2). This is not surprising as long as if farmers are 
declared capital constrained, the leader can expect to obtain public subsidies from the Central 
Government. Above all, this kind of information is not very useful for economic policy: For example, 
if commune leaders point out that “lack of knowledge” is a great constraint for farmers, what should 
be done? Does the development of information centers could solve the problem? Do farmers really 
apply advices given by staff members? Building a good policy for reducing households’ constraints 
requires an ex-ante evaluation of the impact of policy tools.  
 
                                                           
7
 This problem could be referred to a « nay-saying ». See Couch and Keniston (1960). 
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  4.2.2.3 Infrastructure variables 
The main critics against information given by the household and the commune leader are 
subjectivity and the impossibility of ex ante evaluation of development policies.  Infrastructure data 
correspond much better to our objectives. The choice of relevant infrastructure data follows 
household and commune questionnaires: we focus on output and input market access, credit 
constraint, meteorological and epidemic disasters, access to information and new technologies and 
quality of infrastructures such as irrigation and electricity networks.  
Market access is represented by the distance from the hamlet to the nearest market and we 
distinguish between input and output markets. Credit constraint is approximated by the distance to 
the nearest institutional lender (State Bank, Private Bank or Credit Organization). 
Irrigational network is measured by the share of irrigated land in the commune and access to 
electricity is a dummy variable equal to one if the commune is connected to the national electricity 
network and zero otherwise. 
 Vietnam has a tropical monsoon climate and experiences frequent weather-related natural 
disasters. Uncertainty generated by meteorological events can prevent farmers from predicting their 
marginal revenue of labor, so that they fail in equalizing it to their shadow wage. Recent disasters are 
included in the regression in order to measure this phenomenon. 
Access to information is proxied by the distance to the nearest extension center and 
household level dummies recording meetings with extension center staff members. As noted by 
Munshi (2008), technological knowledge is an important issue in rural areas and numerous studies 
focus on social networks in order to understand technology diffusion across groups. Here, we try to 
determine the way political leaders should intervene to increase the rate and the speed of 
technological adoption. This issue is summed up into three variables: distance to the nearest 
extension center, having visited an information center, or having been visited by a promotion agent. 
The best form of promotion of new technologies with farmers should be revealed.  
 Land market may severely constrain farm households. Considering that productivity of land is 
limited, the absence of a land market can make farmers underemployed. According to Barrett (1996), 
peasants are risk averse and their labor position (over or underemloyed) is determined by their land 
endowment: Net sellers (abundant land) are underemployed, while net buyers (scarce land) are 
overemployed. Fortunately, these two effects act with different signs: while price uncertainty makes 
farmer with a small land endowment overemployed, land market constraint makes them 
underemployed.  
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In the case of employees, we are interested in finding what could reduce job scarcity in rural 
areas. Indeed, employees are supposed to find a better match between shadow and market wages if 
many job offers are available. Distance from the hamlet to the nearest road accessible by car is found 
to be potential instrument for economic policy toward employees. 
4.3 Building variables representing possible constraints 
 If no constraint binds, then households are supposed to succeed in equalizing labor prices and 
the inefficiency score , equals one. Hence each “constraint variable” included in the model must be 
built so that it equals 0 if the constraint does not bind and a positive value otherwise. The 
construction of distance variables (to financial organizations, markets or information center) is thus 
natural: log transformations of recorded distances are used and distances inferior to 1km are 
recoded as 1. Natural disasters are also easily coded as 1 if a catastrophe occurred in the last year 
and zero otherwise. Finally, the percentage of non-irrigated land in the commune is used to control 
for the irrigational network. 
 Other variables must be constructed in a less natural way: Having visited or having been visited 
by agricultural promotion services must be coded so that farmers who didn’t access to information 
are coded as one and others have zero. The same applies to the access to the national power grid. 
 Last but not least is the problem of land. In Barrett (1996)’s framework, there exists a land per 
head ratio for which farmers are self-sufficient (neither net sellers nor net buyers). Hence, low land 
per head endowments are related to overemployment and high land per head endowments are 
associated to underemployment. The expected relationship is thus:  
,def!gf = )0 + )1ln hijklℎkhj	 
If )1 < 0, then the price risk effect proposed by Barrett (1996) dominates. Farmers are price 
risk averse and price stabilization policies should be implemented. If )1 > 0, peasants are 
constrained by their land endowments. Development projects should focus on improving land 
productivity or the extension of cropping area.  
4.4 Constraints on coefficients 
 As explained above, we estimate a mixture of two models sharing the same stochastic frontier. 
This raises the question of the parameter estimated in the two groups (over or underemployed). 
Should they be different, equal or opposite? The answer depends on the activity considered: 
Employees only suffer from job scarcity which can make them both over and underemployed, while 
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farmers may face many constraints at the same time and each of them will tend to make her over or 
underemployed.  
   4.4.1 Employees 
Consider first the case of an employee: if a worker can choose between a large numbers of 
jobs, she can surely find a position where her wage equals her opportunity cost of time (, = 1	. 
However, if job offers are scarce, she may be overemployed (, → +∞	 or underemployed (, → 0	. 
Job scarcity will always move the worker away from the equilibrium as presented in figure 1: the 
expected relationship between job scarcity and our inefficiency variable "," is decreasing if our 
worker is overemployed and increasing if she is underemployed. Variables affecting access to 
employment have opposite effects on "," for overemployed and underemployed.  Parameters of 
employees’ determinants of inefficiency will be constrained to be symmetric in the two groups 
(MX = −MU for employees). 
Figure 1 – Expected relationship between job scarcity inefficiency variable “k” 
 
4.4.2 Self-Employed 
 In the case of self-employed workers, this symmetry disappears.  In fact, whatever the position 
of the farmer with respect to his shadow wage (over or underemployed), a quantity constraint on an 
input which is complementary with household labor will induce underutilization of both the input 
and labor so that the worker will be underemployed. To make things clearer, consider a peasant A 
who is underemployed and a farmer B who is overemployed. If a new constraint on an input appears, 
then farmer A will become “more” underemployed, while farmer B will be “less” overemployed and 
may become underemployed too. There is no reason why over- or underemployed farmers would 
suffer differently from the same constraint. So we will constrain parameters of self-employed 
workers to be the same in the two groups (MX = MU for self-employed). 
Number 
of Job 
Offers 
lnk 
0 
Underemployed 
Overemployed 
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4.5 Empirical tests 
 Econometric application is performed in two steps: First, a test between Lambert and Magnac 
(1998) and Adesina, Barret and Sherlund (2008) is proposed and demonstrates that both farmers and 
employees fail in equalizing labor prices. However, it seems that constraints faced by farmers are 
stronger than that of employees. Then, a Horse race including other relevant variables representing 
possible constraints is performed and confirms the importance of income uncertainty as a major 
constraint to peasants’ behaviors while employees would benefit from improved road networks.. 
4.5.1 First test: Barrett (1996) versus Lambert and Magnac (1998) 
 Table 6 presents estimation results for a test based on Lambert and Magnac (1998) and Barrett 
(1996). First, a comparison of the labor elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas production function with those 
found in the literature tends to support the approach proposed here: Estimated elasticities found in 
the literature are very heterogeneous: While Strauss (1986) finds an elasticity of 0.6 for rural Sierra 
Leone, Deolalikar (1988) estimates it at 0.35 for rural South India, Jacoby (1993) obtains 0.10 for 
Peruvian Sierra and Skoufias (1994) finds 0.13 for rural India. Finally, Le (2009) estimates this 
elasticity for Vietnam and finds 0.0472 for males and 0.0782 for females. These last results seem to 
be very low as compared to other studies. Our method gives results closer to that found in the 
literature: estimated labor elasticity of production is 0.37, close to Deolalikar (1988) and comprised 
between 0.05 and 0.6 confirming its consistence. 
 Also, determinants of preferences present consistent results: preference for consumption 
increases with age; women have relatively lower shadow wages than men. More educated workers 
expect higher wages. Finally, household size decreases the preference for consumption, as in a 
model in which people enjoy spending time with relatives8.  
Econometric results confirm the intuition that individuals fail in equalizing shadow wages and 
hourly income. Furthermore, we find a large proportion of underemployment in the population: 
shadow wages are lower than their observed hourly income. This result implies that an increase in 
labor demand could be absorbed by the labor force without strong pressures on wages. It confirms 
the consensus which usually considers that Vietnamese work few hours and that labor demand could 
increase without inflation. 
                                                           
8
 U-shape tests (Lind and Mehlum, 2007) reject turning points for all variables. 
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Coefficient
Standard 
errors
Age 0,045 *** (0,003)
Age² - 0,000 *** (0,000)
Female 0,164 *** (0,015)
hhold size - 0,242 *** (0,016)
hhold size ² 0,012 *** (0,001)
nb of children - 0,144 *** (0,014)
nb of children ² 0,006 ** (0,003)
nb of members aged 65+ 0,035 (0,037)
nb of members age 65+ ² - 0,019 (0,020)
Attained Primary School - 0,076 ** (0,032)
Attained Lower Secondary School - 0,022 (0,023)
Attained Higher Secondary School - 0,072 *** (0,021)
Attained Post Secondary Education - 0,076 (0,048)
Vocational Training 0,022 (0,027)
Constant - 1,279 *** (0,074)
Log of  σv² - 1,452 *** (0,076)
Log of γ - 0,988 *** (0,039)
Labor Elasticity of Output "γ"
Log of Distance to the nearest Road 0,255 *** (0,037)
Log of  σu² - 0,947 *** (0,087)
Inverse logit transformation of po - 2,228 *** (0,121)
Proportion of overemployed workers
Log of Land per hand - 0,666 *** (0,030)
Constant 4,938 *** (0,321)
Log of  σu² 0,204 *** (0,053)
Inverse logit transformation of po - 3,970 *** (0,177)
Proportion of overemployed farmers
Number of observations 14 316
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Farmers' 
Inefficiency
1,9%
0.37
Dependent variable: lhs
Table 6: Barrett (1996) versus Lambert and Magnac (1998)
Preferences over 
consumption and 
leisure (Log of α/β)
Production Function 
Parameter
Employees' 
Inefficiency
9,7%
 
 
Interpreting inefficiency parameters 
 Empirical results support our intuitions regarding the determinants of allocative inefficiency: 
increasing farm size tends to decrease inefficiency scores of farmers and makes them 
underemployed as predicted by the model of Barrett (1996) where farmers are price risk averse. 
Proximity of roads is found to have a significant impact on allocative efficiency of employees: 
reducing the distance to the nearest road makes employees’ inefficiency scores to tend towards zero 
(perfect allocative efficiency), while increasing this distance can make workers either overemployed 
or underemployed. 
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 Table 6 shows that allocative inefficiency is present in our data and it proposes sources for 
such inefficiencies. However, it does not tell us how strong is the allocative gap generated by these 
failures. Answering this question needs some additional steps: first, individuals must be classified as 
over- or underemployed. Then, a prediction of individual inefficiency scores must be performed.  
 Classification is based on the following formulae: 
jXn = 1  if  XX WXXn + 1 − X	UnY⁄ > 0.5   and zero otherwise 
jUn = 1  if  XXn WXXn + 1 − X	UnY⁄ < 0.5   and zero otherwise 
Where jXn = 1  (jUn = 1	 for individuals classified as overemployed (underemployed). 
 Then, inefficiency scores are predicted given our classification. Battese and Coelli (1988)’s 
formula for inefficiency scores is used to predict individual differences between shadow wage and 
market wage or marginal revenue of labor: 
,n = pWexp−C:n	 |\nY 
,n =
1 − Ф 7P∗ − un∗P∗ 8
1 − Ф 7−un∗P∗ 8
. exp 7−un∗ + 12 P∗c8 
Where  un∗ = −C\n . PUc + LM. PQc	  PZc⁄   , P∗ = PU. PQ PZ⁄ , C = −1  if overemployed, and C = 1  if 
underemployed 
Distinguishing between farmers and employees, we obtain the distributions for inefficiency 
scores presented in graphs 1 and 2.  
Both farmers and employees appear as strongly underemployed even if farmers are more 
constrained than employees (table 7).Farmers’ shadow wages appear as being 3 times lower than 
their marginal revenue of labor, while market wages are 1.5 times higher than employees shadow 
wages. Given their hourly income, most of the Vietnamese workers in our sample would prefer to 
work more. Policy implications for employees are straightforward: job opportunities should be made 
more accessible, and developing road access is a promising tool. Concerning peasants, the link with 
farm size emphasized by Barrett seems to prove correct: increasing farm size tends to make peasants 
underemployed. Following Barrett’s framework, this result highlights the importance of policies 
aiming at stabilizing producer prices in Vietnam: In fact, underemployed farmers in Barrett’s model 
are net sellers and income risk averse: price uncertainty leads them to underemploy inputs and 
reduces output.  
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Table 7 – Mean comparison test for inefficiency scores 
Obs ervations
Mean 
inefficiency 
s core
Standard Error Obs ervations
Mean 
inefficiency 
s core
Standard Error
3883 -0,458 0,004 183 0,873 0,172
10164 -1,121 0,007 86 1,415 0,052
Di fference
H1: di ff<0 (Pva lue)
H1: diﬀ≠0 (Pva lue)
H1: di ff>0 (Pva lue)
Underemployed Overemployed
Employees
Farmers
0,663 -0,542
H0: di ff=0
1,0000 0,0000
0,0000 0,0000
0,0000 1,0000
 
4.5.2 Robustness test: Include other possible constraints 
The objective of the paper is to propose and agenda of economic policies that could improve 
economic efficiency for rural areas in Vietnam. Other possible constraints are thus introduced. We 
follow the household and commune questionnaires and include output and input market access 
variables, credit constraint, meteorological and epidemic disasters, access to information and new 
technologies and quality of infrastructures such as irrigation and electricity networks.  
Results presented in table 8 are consistent with those found in the previous section: the 
determinants of individual preferences still present the same coefficients, and estimated labor 
elasticity of production remains around 0.35. Inefficiency scores presented in graphs 3 and 4 remain 
similar to the previous estimations, and the weight attributed to price risk (land per head in our 
estimations) remains the same. Furthermore, it remains the main contributor to underemployment 
of farmers. Other factors generating underemployment are credit constraint and meteorological or 
epidemic disasters (Vietnam hardly suffered from the avian flu in early twenties, and the first cases 
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were discovered in December 2003). Factors generating overemployment are the absence of 
national electricity network and low level of irrigation.  
 Our results highlight factors participating to the stabilization of peasants’ incomes. Indeed, 
irrigational networks facilitate farmers’ job and make output more predictable. Credit access allows 
investments in new technologies which often increase the stability of agricultural output. Farmers far 
from their output market lose market power and can hardly find buyers for their production so that 
selling prices are unpredictable. Finally, as noticed earlier, the sensibility of farmer to their land 
endowment reveals their price risk aversion.   
 
Price uncertainty is still the main difficulty faced by peasants in rural Vietnam even after 
controlling for other possible constraints.  Allocative inefficiencies generated by price uncertainty 
significantly reduce the amount of opportunities peasants can grab. In a sense, price uncertainty 
prevents Vietnamese farmers to escape out of poverty. This result should bring policy leaders and 
economists to pay attention to price and income stabilization policies. Recently, Ghosh and Whalley 
(2004) demonstrated that price stabilization policies may be welfare improving for Vietnam. Other 
policy options such as the implementation of futures markets should be analyzed in order to propose 
the best policy mix for Vietnam. These questions are of particular importance in light of recent 
evolutions of agricultural prices on world markets. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The implementation of development policies requires important adaptations to the 
specificities of the country under scrutiny. The aim of this paper is precisely to recover what are the 
main constraints faced by workers living in rural areas in Vietnam in order to propose a policy agenda 
focusing on these failures. Our point of view is that difficulties faced by workers will always influence 
their labor market equilibrium so that one can retrieve these market imperfections when analyzing 
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individual labor market positions. Precisely, workers can be under or overemployed: they would like 
to work more or less respectively given their hourly income (market wage for employees and 
marginal revenue of labor for farmers). This article proposes to measure the gap between hourly 
income and individual shadow wages (also called opportunity cost of time or implicit wage) and 
explain it by variables representing possible difficulties that workers could face. The main difficulty of 
the approach is to obtain a measure of shadow wages against which we can compare observed 
hourly incomes (market wages or marginal revenue of labor). Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences 
over consumption and leisure, we show that individual opportunity costs of time can be though as a 
stochastic frontier around which observed hourly incomes are distributed. Overemployed workers 
are located over the frontier while underemployed people stay below the frontier.  
 Estimation on a sample of 14,000 individuals in rural Vietnam shows that employees 
could benefit from the development of road network that help them to catch better job 
opportunities while farmers primarily suffer from price uncertainty. Risk averse farmers underemploy 
labor as demonstrated by Barrett (1996). Priority should thus be given to policies aiming at reducing 
income volatility in the agricultural sector. Different policy options must be considered. Ghosh and 
Whalley (2004) emphasize the welfare gains that could be obtained from a price stabilization policy. 
Other instruments such as the implementation of agricultural futures markets (or the use of existing 
markets as proposed by Morgan and Vaillant (1999))) should be analyzed.  Finally, the large share of 
underemployment found in our sample (96%) confirms the idea that labor demand could increase in 
Vietnam without strong pressures on wages, so that inflation could be limited. Also, given that most 
of Vietnamese workers are underemployed, the reduction of failures should increase the activity rate 
and be a source of growth.  
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Standard 
Errors
Age 0,050 *** (0,0030)
Age² - 0,001 *** (0,0000)
Female 0,165 *** (0,0144)
hhold size - 0,244 *** (0,0158)
hhold size ² 0,012 *** (0,0013)
nb of children - 0,148 *** (0,0139)
nb of children ² 0,004 (0,0031)
nb of members aged 65+ 0,050 (0,0362)
nb of members age 65+ ² - 0,020 (0,0199)
Attained Primary School - 0,009 (0,0303)
Attained Lower Secondary School - 0,018 (0,0231)
Attained Higher Secondary School - 0,079 *** (0,0213)
Attained Post Secondary Education - 0,098 ** (0,0482)
Vocational Training 0,037 (0,0267)
Constant - 1,423 *** (0,0738)
Log of  σv² - 1,472 *** (0,0775)
Log of γ - 0,963 *** (0,0435)
Labor Elasticity of Output "γ"
Log of Distance to the nearest Road 0,243 *** (0,0379)
Log of  σu² - 0,908 *** (0,0825)
Inverse logit transformation of po - 2,159 *** (0,1210)
Proportion of overemployed workers
Log of Land per hand - 0,616 *** (0,0260)
Constant 4,086 *** (0,2820)
Log of Distance to the nearest output market 0,096 *** (0,0201)
Log of Distance to the nearest Input Market 0,011 (0,0174)
Log of Distance to the nearest Bank - 0,046 *** (0,0139)
Log of Distance to the nearest Extension Center - 0,007 (0,0162)
Has been visited by an agronomist - 0,073 (0,0533)
Has visited an agronomist 0,115 *** (0,0336)
% of non irrigated land in the commune 0,717 *** (0,0615)
Not connected to the national power grid 0,400 *** (0,0829)
Meteorological disaster - 0,074 ** (0,0352)
Epidemy - 0,153 *** (0,0349)
Log of  σu² 0,042 (0,0541)
Inverse logit transformation of po - 3,949 *** (0,1780)
Proportion of overemployed farmers
Table 8: Introducing determinants of allocative inefficiency
Dependent variable: lhs Coefficient
Preferences over 
consumption and 
leisure (Log of α/β)
Production Function 
Parameter 0,38
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Employees' 
Inefficiency
10,35%
Farmers' Inefficiency
1,89%
Observations 14 316
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Appendix: Tables and Graphs 
Table 1: Individual and household characteristics for employees 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Dependent variable (lhs) -1.86 0.68 -5.28 1.79 
Age 32.03 11.65 8 87 
Female 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Number of children in the hhold 1.21 1.10 0 5 
Nb of people aged of 65+ in the hhold 0.22 0.51 0 3 
household size 4.95 1.78 1 14 
Primary school 0.94 0.23 0 1 
Low secondary school 0.72 0.45 0 1 
High secondary school 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Post secondray studies 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Vocational training 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Consumption per head 4103.36 2383.30 782.31 35856.9 
Hours of work per year 1694.76 725.52 36 5400 
Hourly wage 4.12 3.47 0.06 70.31 
 
 
Table 2: Individual and household characteristics for peasants 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Dependent variable -3.62 1.14 -9.81 0.75 
Age 36.62 16.35 6 98 
Female 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Number of children in the hhold 1.48 1.34 0 10 
Nb of people aged of 65+ in the hhold 0.28 0.57 0 3 
household size 5.16 2.03 1 20 
Primary school 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Low secondary school 0.59 0.49 0 1 
High secondary school 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Post secondray studies 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Vocational training 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Consumption per head 3262.05 1764.51 654.96 32421.6 
Hours of work per year 1161.63 687.25 4 3744 
Value of Agricultural production 
 (thousand VND) 
19034.79 20633.12 68 422492 
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Table 3: Households self-declared constraints 
Farmers self-declared constraints (number of positive/negative responses) 
  
 
 
Yes No 
Has your household faced any difficulties in 
production during the last 12 months?  
3149 5123 
Most frequent difficulties faced in production during the last 12 months 
Lack of capital/Difficult access to sources of 
capital 
2136 1013 
Lack of knowledge on new technologies and 
techniques 
1226 1923 
Natural disasters/droughts/ floods/failures 
in doing business 
1197 1952 
Affected by prices/Demand-Supply balance 1527 1622 
 
 
 
Table 4: Difficulties faced by farmers as declared by commune leaders 
Main difficulties faced by commune farmers in agricultural production 
 (number of positive/negative responses) 
  
  
Yes No 
Lack of capital/Difficult access to sources of capital 827 1317 
Lack of new varieties / varieties suitable for local conditions 453 1691 
Lack of technical and new technology knowledge 586 1558 
Prices / Demand and Supply impact / Unstable consumption 
market / difficult access 
893 1251 
poor irrgational network 323 1821 
Calamities / droughts / floods 512 1632 
Difficult access to agricultural services 47 2097 
Inapropriate agricultural policy 167 1977 
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Table 5: Determinants of labor allocative inefficiency 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Constraints faced by employees 
Log of distance to the nearest road 0.12 0.46 0 4.09 
Constraints faced by farmers 
Log of land per capita 8.39 0.90 0.15 12.01 
Log of distance to the nearest Extension Center 2.11 0.99 0 5.30 
Have been visited by an information Center staff member 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Have visited an information Center 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Have access to national electricity network 0.93 0.26 0 1 
Percentage of irrigated land in the commune 0.60 0.35 0 1 
Suffered from meteorological disaster in the last year 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Suffered from epidemic disaster in the last year 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Log of distance to the nearest Credit Institution 0.02 0.22 0 4.60 
Log of distance to the nearest output market 1.08 1.37 0 4.60 
Log of Distance to the nearest input market 1.36 1.57 0 4.60 
 
